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A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated
individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the
incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation.
However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competition at a higher
level of organizational hierarchy. Here we show that competition between groups resolves the paradigmatic
‘public goods’ social dilemma and increases within-group cooperation and overall productivity. Further,
group competition intensiﬁes the moral emotions of anger and guilt associated with violations of the
cooperative norm. The results suggest an important role for group conﬂict in the evolution of human
cooperation and moral emotions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread
occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals.
From an economic and evolutionary viewpoint, the
maintenance of such cooperation is puzzling since
cooperation is often costly: an individual performing the
cooperative act carries the costs of cooperation, while
individuals who do not contribute to cooperation gain the
beneﬁts without having to pay for the costs. The incentive
to free ride on other individuals’ efforts when the beneﬁts
of cooperation fall upon all members of a group is
expected to lead to decay of cooperation, even though
members of cooperative groups are better off than
members of uncooperative groups.
However, human social interactions are not limited to
within-group interactions, but groups also interact and
compete. Darwin (1871) proposed that competition
between groups could have selected for individual traits
suchascourageandfaithfulnessthatcontributetoagroup’s
success in conﬂict. Cooperation and competition between
human groups in many different organizational levels are
obviousinactivities,e.g. of academicresearchteams, sports
teams and armies. Although competition between groups is
generally regarded as the ultimate selective force favouring
costly within-group cooperation among non-related indi-
viduals (Wilson 1975; Avile ´s2 0 0 2 ; Boyd et al. 2003; West
et al. 2007), it has received relatively little attention from
empiricists in comparison with the various forms of
reciprocity and punishment that have been suggested to
function as proximate mechanisms allowing the mainten-
ance of cooperation (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton
1981;Nowak&Sigmund1998;Wedekind&Milinski2000;
Fehr & Ga ¨chter 2002; Gu ¨rerk et al. 2006). The existing
empirical studies, using various experimental designs, have
shown that group competition promotes within-group
cooperation (Erev et al. 1993; Gunnthorsdottir& Rapoport
2006; West et al. 2006; Tan & Bolle 2007). We studied
cooperation in an experiment where reciprocation and
communication among subjects was excluded, and where
the effect of group competition was determined by the
difference in the performance of the groups. This novel
experimental set-up comes with a number of important
beneﬁts in comparison with earlier studies. First, it allows
unravellingtheeffectofgroupcompetitionin theabsenceof
proximate mechanisms possibly maintaining cooperation.
Second, it allows the derivation of the analytic solution for
the relationship between the strength of group competition
and expected level of cooperation. Third, and most
important, it allows the assessment of the effect of group
competition on total productivity in a straight forward
manner, unlike the previous studies where group compe-
tition has been for a ﬁxed external prize.
Human decision making is affected not only by rational
calculations of material pay-offs, but also by emotions.
Moral emotions originate from norms delineating socially
acceptable behaviour. These norms are enforced by social
control, but are also internalized so that violations of social
norms elicit feelings of anger (when others violate norms)
and guilt (when one violates norms oneself). It has been
argued that the primary function of feelings of anger and
guilt is to uphold cooperative relationships (Trivers 1971;
Fessler & Haley 2003). In natural settings, deception
elicits anger and moralistic aggression which serve as a
credible threat of punishment, making deception less
proﬁtable. Guilt on the other hand makes deception less
proﬁtable by eliciting a feeling of internal discomfort, and
also motivates reparative behaviour to mend damaged
cooperative relationships. Quite revealingly, moral norms
and emotions are usually highly group speciﬁc so that they
primarily function to regulate within-group interactions,
but are not applied to out-group members (Bernhard
et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2006). Internalized moral norms,
and the resulting moral emotions, are likely to be the
proximate reason explaining the outcome of certain
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punishment’ in public goods games (Fehr & Ga ¨chter
2002; West et al. 2007). To gain insight into the emotions
possibly affecting cooperative behaviour, we studied the
effect of between-group competition on the perception of
group members as competitors or collaborators, and on
self-reported moral emotions: anger towards subjects who
donate less and guilt when the subject earned more than
other group members.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Experimental set-up
A total of 192 students (eightsessionswith 24 subjects in each)
took part in a decision-making experiment with real monetary
stakes and two treatment conditions: public goods (PG) and
publicgoodswithgroupcompetition(GC).Gameinstructions
given to subjects are available in the electronic supplementary
material accompanying the paper. In the PG treatment, the
subjects played the following game in groups of four (nZ4):
eachsubjectreceivedanendowmentof 20money units (MUs)
and each one could contribute between 0 and 20 MUs to a
groupproject.Thesubjectscouldkeepthemoneythattheydid
not contributetothe project.The number of MUs contributed
to the group project by all the subjects was multiplied by the
experimenter by factor a (aZ2), and divided equally among
the four group members. The beneﬁt from investing one
additional MU to the group project is
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Thus, by investing one additional MU in the group project,
a subject got a net beneﬁt of K0.5 MUs, and it was in the
material self-interest of any subject to keep all MUs privately—
irrespective of how much the other three subjects contributed.
Yet, if all the group members kept all MUs privately, each
subject earned only 20 MUs, whereas if all of them invested
their 20 MUs, each subject would earn (4!2!20)/
4Z40 MUs.
The GC treatment was otherwise identical with the PG
treatment, except that after money in the group project was
divided among the group members, a group competition effect
wasexecuted:two randomly drawngroupswere pairedand the
differenceintotalMUsbetweenthetwogroupswascalculated.
The group with more earnings then received b times (bZ2) the
difference in the total MUs between the groups, and the group
with fewer earnings suffered the loss of an equal number of
MUs. The winnings and losses were divided equally among
the members of the respective groups. In the GC treatment,
there is no single most proﬁtable strategy, since proﬁts gained
from within-group competition are exactly cancelled by losses
in the between-group competition. However, as in PG,
investing in the group project always resulted in reduced
income relative to other members of the group. Formally, the
net beneﬁt from investing one additional MU in the group
project in the GC treatment was
BGCZ ðK1ÞC
a!1
n

C
b!1
n
Z ðK1ÞC
2!1
4

C
2!1
4
Z0:
ð2:2Þ
This means that no matter what a subject contributed to
the group project, his/her private earnings were not
affected. Investing more in the group project, however,
increased the earnings of own-group members and
decreased earnings of members of the competing group.
As in the PG treatment, the collectively most proﬁtable
strategy would be for everyone to invest all MUs in the
group project, because then all players earn 40 MUs,
instead of 20 MUs when no one invests.
In both the treatments the investment decisions were
anonymous. The subjects made their investment decisions
simultaneously. After the decisions were made, the subjects
were informed about the investments of the other group
members and the resulting pay-offs. In the group competition
effect, the players were informed of the total amount of MUs
in their own and in the competing group, and the resulting
effects to both groups and to their own-group members
individually. All the subjects played 10 identical rounds of
both games. Between rounds, the groups were randomly
reconstructed so that the subjects never played the same game
with the same people again. To examine the possible effects of
playing one treatment before the other, half of the sessions
consisted of 10 rounds of the PG treatment followed by 10
rounds of the GC treatment. In the other half of the sessions,
the treatments were applied in reverse order. After playing
both treatments, the subjects were asked to report their
perception about group members in both treatments by
ticking an appropriate position on a line spanning from
collaborator to competitor. For both treatments, the subjects
were also asked to report their feelings of anger towards own-
group members who invested less than they did to the group
project, and feelings of guilt when they earned more than the
other subjects in the group. Emotions were reported by
ticking an appropriate position on a line spanning from no
emotion to strong emotion.
(b) General experimental procedures
Subjects to the study were recruited from all faculties in the
University of Jyva ¨skyla ¨ with emails sent to student mailing
lists, announcing a study involving playing a game on a
computer and a chance to earn money. The subjects
registered to attend a game session via the University course
web service. The game sessions were held in two computer
classrooms with 12 computers. Each computer was in a
separate cubicle with a cloth covering the entrance. The
subjects were directed to computers in a random order when
24 subjects had arrived. If there were more willing subjects
than required, the last to arrive were given a 5 V show-up fee
and excused. Subject names were not called out.
Once in the cubicle, the subjects ﬁrst read a sheet of paper
explaining that they were taking part in a decision-making
experiment, that their earnings would depend on decisions
made by themselves and the other subjects, and that all
decisions and the amount of money earned would not be
known by other subjects. The paper also included
the sequence of events that would take place during the
experiment. Next, the subjects read the instructions to the
ﬁrst game treatment (PG or GC, depending on the session),
also on a sheet of paper (English translations of the original
instructions in Finnish are given in the electronic supple-
mentary material).
After everyone had read the instructions, the subjects were
asked to put on earmuffs to exclude any auditory disturbance,
and the experimenter started the computer software. The
software ﬁrst presented a series of questions to make sure that
everyone understood the structure of the game. After all the
subjects in the session had correctly answered all questions,
the game started and ran automatically until the last round.
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number of MUs they earned during the game (a backup for
possible computer failure).
Next, the experimenter dealt out instructions for the
second game (PG or GC, depending on the session). After
reading the instructions, the subjects had to again answer a set
of questions on a computer to make sure the instructionswere
understood. After all the subjects had correctly answered all
the questions, the game started and ran automatically until
the last round. After the last round of the second game, the
subjects wrote down the number of MUs earned. The
experimenter then handed out a questionnaire asking some
background information about the subjects (age, sex, etc),
and about emotions felt in the game. The subjects could also
ﬁll in a voluntary contact information sheet. Conﬁdentiality
of all the information was assured. After subjects had ﬁlled in
the questionnaire, they were individually excused and paid
in cash the amount of euros corresponding to their earnings in
the whole game session.
(c) Data and statistical analysis
Analysis of factors affecting investments in the group project
is based on data, where the investments of all players in a
session are averaged for each game round. Owing to a
software problem, in one game there are investment data only
for the ﬁrst eight rounds, but this does not create any
problems for data analysis.
We analysed the mean investment to the group projects by
a linear mixed model procedure of SPSS statistical software
(v. 14.0.2). We used the design of the basic cross-over model
(table 1), where the full model includes the main ﬁxed effects
of the variables ‘period’, ‘order’, ‘round’, and all their
interactions; and random effects of the variable ‘session’
(nested within order) and the interaction between ‘session’
and ‘period’. Variable ‘period’ codes for ﬁrst and second
game in a session. Variable ‘order’ codes for the order of the
treatments (PG and GC) in a session. Variable ‘round’ codes
for 10 rounds within the period. Variable ‘session’ codes for
eight separate game sessions. By means of the cross-over
model, we are able to control the carry-over effect between
periods, as the investment during the latter period can be
affected by the previous period. In the present model, the
treatment effect (PG or GC) is equivalent to the period-
by-order interaction.
Effects of game treatment on perception of group
members and on emotions of anger and guilt were tested
with paired samples t-test, comparing the values for each
subject. For the analysis, the continuous perception datawere
coded so that collaborator got a value 0 and competitor value
100. Similarly, data for emotions were coded 0 for no emotion
and 100 for strong emotion. Data for emotion of guilt were
collected from seven sessions, data for perception of group
members and on emotion of anger were collected for all
eight sessions.
3. RESULTS
The level of cooperation (i.e. the level of investments
to the group project) was considerably higher in the
GC treatment than in the PG treatment (ﬁgure 1;
Table 1. Results of mixed-model analysis on investments to the group project. (Variable ‘period’ codes for ﬁrst and second game
in a session. Variable ‘order’ codes for the order of the treatments (PG and GC) in a session. The interaction period!order tests
for the effect of the treatment (PG versus GC) on investments to the group project. Session (order) and its interactions are
random effects.)
test statistic p
intercept F1,6.024Z1416.21 0.000
period F1,6.019Z4.56 0.077
order F1,6.024Z7.88 0.031
round F9,106.082Z1.75 0.086
treatment (Zperiod!order) F1,6.019Z6.02 0.000
order!round F9,106.082Z0.32 0.969
period!round F9,106.082Z0.43 0.914
treatment!round (Zperiod!order!round) F9,106.082Z3.36 0.001
session (order) ZZ0.22 0.825
period!session (order) ZZ1.41 0.159
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Figure 1. Investments to the group project. Triangles, PG treatment; circles, GC treatment. Symbols denote the mean of session
means. Error bars denote 95% conﬁdence interval of mean.
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order interaction corresponds to the treatment effect
PG versus GC). As the overall earnings are a linear
function of the level of cooperation, productivity
measured as mean earnings over the 10 game rounds
was also higher in the presence of group competition than
in its absence (333 versus 251 MUs, paired samples t-test,
t167ZK21.98, p!0.001).
The order of the game treatments had a signiﬁcant
effect on the level of investments (order effect, table 1).
Investments in the GC treatment were higher when the
GC treatment was the second treatment than when it was
the ﬁrst treatment. This effect was possibly due to
frustration from low earnings in the PG game, which
then prompted higher investments in the following GC
game. Game round affected investments differentially in
thetwotreatments(signiﬁcanttreatment!roundinteraction,
table 1). In the PG treatment, investments decreased as
the game proceeded. This is a very general result in public
goods games (Ledyard 1995). In the GC treatment, the
average level of investments stayed nearly constant
across rounds, possibly reﬂecting the independence of
individual earnings of investment to group project and the
consequent lack of a best single strategy for maximizing
individual pay-offs.
Competition between groups affected the perception
of group members and moral emotions in the game.
Mirroring the increased level of cooperation in the GC
treatment, the subjects perceived their group members
more as collaborators in the GC treatment and more
as competitors in the PG treatment (ﬁgure 2; paired
samples t-test, t190Z15.75 p!0.001). The self-reported
feelingsof anger towardsfree riderswerefairly highin both
treatments (ﬁgure 3), but signiﬁcantly higher in GC
treatment (mean increase 14.2 percentage points, paired
samples t-test, t191ZK6.25, p!0.001). The self-reported
feelings of guilt from own uncooperative actions were
generallyquitelow(ﬁgure3),butalsosigniﬁcantlyhigherin
GC treatment than in the PG treatment (mean increase
4.9%points,pairedsamplest-test,t164ZK2.88pZ0.004).
4. DISCUSSION
Our study shows that between-group competition radically
increases thelevelofwithin-groupcooperationin the public
goods social dilemma. The within-group social dilemma of
the public goods game can be dissolved by between-group
competition because between-group competition aligns
individual and group interests (West et al. 2007), even in
one-shot interactions where groups are reformed each
round. Remarkably, the presence of between-group
competition resulted in higher average earnings and
increased overall productivity in our study. This result
contrasts with studies on punishment as a mechanism
promoting cooperation, because the costs of punishment
usually outweigh the beneﬁts of increased cooperation,
leading to lower average earnings in games where punish-
ment is allowed (Fehr & Ga ¨chter 2002; Egas & Riedl 2008;
Herrmann et al. 2008; see also Gu ¨rerk et al. 2006).
A key factor in determining the importance of group
competition for within-group cooperation is the relative
strength of between- and within-group competition.
PG
GC
collaborator competitor
Figure 2. Box-plot ﬁgure of perceptions of own-group members on a scale from collaborator to competitor in the PG treatment
and in the GC treatment.
anger (PG)
anger (GC)
guilt (PG)
guilt (GC)
no emotion strong emotion
Figure 3. Box-plot ﬁgure offeelings of anger towards own-group members who donated less to the group project, and feelings of
guilt when a subject earned more than own-group members. PG: public goods treatment; GC: public goods with group
competition treatment.
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only as strong as within-group competition, but it was
sufﬁcient to radically increase cooperation within groups.
There can be little doubt that stronger between-group
competition would result in even higher levels of within-
group cooperation, as cooperation then would be the most
proﬁtable strategy for both individuals and groups. High
levels of between-group competition can thus favour
cooperation also among unrelated individuals. There are
goodreasonstobelievethatbetween-groupcompetitionis,
and has been, severe in most human societies at least
periodically.Humancultureisfulloflegendsofindividuals
joining forces in heroic self-sacriﬁcial acts to defeat the
common enemy. Records of war-like activity in chimpan-
zees (Pan troglodytes; Wilson & Wrangham 2003) and in
pre-historic humans (Keeley 1996; Bowles 2006) suggest
that between-group competition has been an important
factor shaping human social behaviour during the
evolutionary history of the species. In an intriguing recent
study, Choi & Bowles (2007) showed that warfare may
coevolve with the tendencies for altruism and out-group
aggression. Thus, the level of between-group competition
should not be assumed to be determined solely by forces
external to the social system. Instead, group competition
can be seen as both the engine and the legacy of the
coevolutionary process (Arrow 2007).
In our experiment, subjects were anonymous and the
groups were restructured every round. Thus, there were
no possibilities for punishment or reparative behaviour, to
which anger and guilt have been suggested to be
functionally linked (Trivers 1971; Fessler & Haley
2003). These emotions, therefore, seem irrational in the
context of both games. It seems likely that these emotions,
which can result in personal beneﬁts in real-life repeated
interactions, cannot be voluntarily suppressed in anon-
ymous, one-shot experimental settings (Richerson & Boyd
2005; West et al. 2007). Considering that the group-
competition effect was executed via a computer terminal
without any suggestion that the subjects should identify
with members of their current group, the ﬁnding that
levels of anger and guilt were elevated by group
competition suggests the existence of emotional
mechanisms promoting within-group cooperation in the
face of group conﬂict. Further support for this hypothesis
comes from studies where identiﬁcation with group
members has been found to increase the level of
cooperation (De Cremer & Van Vugt 1999).
The public goods game with group competition is an
illustrative framework for studying the consequences of
between-group competition on within-group cooperation,
but as all simpliﬁed models it has its limitations. In our
experiment, interactions between groups were constrained
to be zero-sum competitive interactions where wins by one
group equalled losses of another group. In real life, group
interactions can also beneﬁt both groups, as in proﬁtable
trade, or be destructive to both groups, as in warfare
without a clear winner. Group competition should thus
not be seen as something that inevitably leads to higher
productivity and pay-offs for members of a society. Rather,
group competition should be seen as a force that has
shaped human social behaviour during the evolutionary
history, and a factual force shaping the daily lives of
modern humans, from competition in working life to
clashes between nations.
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